

**SECRET**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY  
G/PM

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TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

October 30, 1962

SUBJECT: Comments on Items III and IV of the  
Agreed Agenda for the State-Defense  
Meeting of October 30

The key problems for immediate decision are the modalities for removal of the offensive weapons in Cuba and verification that no additional ones are imported. Longer run arrangements will depend importantly upon the nature and functioning of these short term expedients. Nonetheless, we must consider also the longer term requirements and arrangements which we desire.

Long term verification requirements must be two criteria: they must provide reasonable assurance against clandestine introduction of nuclear delivery systems into Cuba or other countries covered by these arrangements, and they must limit our freedom of action as little as possible. We are seeking to modify the Brazilian Resolution in order to avoid limitations on our transporting nuclear weapons through the denuclearized zone, but our main effort may have to be made at the time that Latin American and possible African regional conferences convene to establish specific arrangements implementing this Resolution. [One solution for the problem in Latin America is to have the OAS set up a denuclearized zone applying to territory under the jurisdiction of all members of the OAS (which covers Cuba whether or not it attends the conference and concurs). Such an arrangement could apply to "all American Republics which did not possess such capability at the date on which they adhered" to the Rio Treaty]

[REDACTED]

Verification inspection could be called into operation upon the allegation by any American Republic or another member state was failing to comply with, or was preparing to violate, the above undertaking, and could obligate that state to permit without delay duly qualified observers to enter its territory for the purpose of verifying the allegation. Interim UN arrangements would presumably remain until such regional arrangements could go into effect.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY: *[Signature]* DATE: *2/10/68*  
TO: *[Signature]*  
(X) *[Signature]* (X) *[Signature]*  
(X) *[Signature]* (X) *[Signature]*  
FOR: *[Signature]* *[Signature]*  
(X) *[Signature]*


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The second major problem in connection with long term arrangements concerns the extent of US or Hemispheric guarantees not to invade Cuba, and obligations by Cuba in addition to denuclearization.

*201/105*



*201/105*

The US should not, of course, assume any obligations.



beyond reaffirmations of our UN and OAS Charter obligations.

C/PR:RLGAKHOFF:rep

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**EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

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**EXCISE**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by *Roberts* DATE *2/10/80*

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   beyond reaffirmations of our UN and  
OAS Charter obligations.



G/PM:ELGAR:HOFF:pep

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